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BOOK REVIEW
DO WE REALLY HAVE
NO PLACE TO HIDE?
MATTHEW HECTORt

"On the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog."

1
- The New Yorker
Since the dawn of the Information Age, pundits and observers have
often commented on how new technology may impact privacy. Some
thought that the Internet provided increased anonymity, as the famous
New Yorker cartoon quoted above indicates. Since 1993, however, observers have become increasingly aware that privacy is not as protected
as they originally thought. They have provided scenarios that range
from Orwellian nightmares to streamlined open societies. These visions
have yet to come to fruition; however, what many of these observers have
not mentioned is that private corporations have been collecting and compiling data about Americans for years in an attempt to learn more about
consumers. While most of this took place outside the public eye, Robert
O'Harrow, Jr., a writer for the Washington Post, has provided a sometimes frightening glimpse into the world of private data aggregators and
their ties to State and Federal law enforcement in the September 12th
world. His book, No Place To Hide,2 sheds light on the previously
shadowed world of those who know the most about Americans.

t Matthew Hector is a solo transactional attorney licensed in Illinois. He received
his Bachelor of Arts from The University of Alabama, his Juris Doctor from The John Marshall Law School and is currently completing his LL.M. in Information Technology & Privacy Law at The John Marshall Law School. Mr. Hector would like to thank Robert
O'Harrow, Jr. and Professor Leslie Reis for their assistance with this article.See Peter
Steiner, Cartoon, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog, 69 New Yorker 61, (July 5,
1993)(available at http://www.epatric.condfunstuff/dog).
1. See Peter Steiner, Cartoon, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You're a Dog, 69The
New Yorker, Vol. 69 No. 6120, (July 5, 1993)(available at http://www.epatric.comlfunstuff]
dog/).
2. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., No Place To Hide (Free Press 2005).
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O'Harrow points out time and again the amount of data being
stored, the speed with which private data aggregators like ChoicePoint
and Acxiom can process that data, and the frighteningly detailed profiles
they produce. His book also examines the ties between the private data
aggregators and government investigators. In some anecdotes, these ties
are highly effective in capturing criminals;, in others, they are the stuff
of nightmares for those who feel the government should not pry into
their lives. While the book attempts to show the positive and negative
aspects of data aggregation, O'Harrow tends to give short shrift to the
position of both private data aggregators and government law enforcement. This bias overshadows the central message of No Place To Hide:
personal privacy is more limited than the average person thinks.
It is also worth noting that simply by informing people about the
possible threats to their privacy, O'Harrow has taken a step towards
what he considers an ultimate goal of informational privacy policy: allowing Americans to "make adult, refined decisions about how you are
going to share your information."3 No Place To Hide does a great job of
establishing the state of informational privacy in the 21st Century. Setting the tone for the rest of the book, the introduction ends with an apt
quote from President Dwight Eisenhower:
"In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplace
power exists and will persist," Eisenhower said. "We must never let the
weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic
processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods
4
and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together."
By providing readers with a detailed account of the development of
the data aggregation industry and its ties with law enforcement,
O'Harrow points out several areas of concern for the average American.
O'Harrow's first chapter, entitled "Six Weeks in August 5 ," provides
readers with a detailed account of the process by which the USA PATRIOT Act was drafted. He provides an interesting perspective by tracking the lives of Assistant Attorney General Viet Dinh, Jim Dempsey of
6
the Center for Democracy and Technology, and Senator Patrick Leahy.
3. WILL NEED CITE FOR THIS QUOTE TOWARDS THE END OF HIS TALK AT
JMLS, DURING Q&ARobert O'Harrow, Jr., Lecture, No Place To Hide, (Chicago, Ill., Apr.
7, 2005) (copy of transcript on file with The John Marshall Journalof Computer & Information Law).
4. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 9.
5. Id. at 11.
6. Id. at 10-12.
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By following the lives of these men, O'Harrow defines the competing interests that were implicated in the drafting of the USA PATRIOT Act:
"doing whatever was necessary to strengthen the government's legal
hand against terrorists," 7 "check[ing] the increasingly aggressive use of
technology by law enforcement officials," 8 and "striking the right balance" between security and privacy. 9 In the days after the September 11
attacks, the fear of Jack Dempsey and other civil libertarians was that
we would see a return to the age of CONINTELPRO and revelations of
the Church Report. 10 The Department of Justice, "saw a chance to turn
back the clock," to the days before the Church Committee's report
changed the face of domestic intelligence-gathering.1 1 The tension between the civil libertarians and the Department of Justice is highlighted
by Senator Leahy's efforts to strike a balance between the two sides.
O'Harrow's description of the events surrounding the drafting of the
USA PATRIOT Act is also very enlightening. Most interesting is the
description of the meeting between DOJ officials, Senate staffers and the
privacy advocates. The representatives of the Department of Justice
were upset to see their privacy-minded counterparts and initially refused
to engage in a discussion with them, finally agreeing to simply read
DOJ's suggestions and then leave. 12 Also interesting is his account of
Senator Leahy's failed deal with former Attorney General John Ashcroft.
Although Leahy had been under the impression that the Administration
wanted to draft legislation that balanced security and privacy, he quickly
found that many of his changes never made it past the initial drafting
stages. 13 One example O'Harrow provides involves Section 215 of the
14
USA PATRIOT Act, also colloquially known as the "library provision."
The book focuses, however, on the idea that Section 215 expanded law
enforcement's power to obtain business records which had been expanded to, "in essence, any business."1 5 This sets up one of the overarching themes of No Place To Hide: the unlikely marriage between pri7. Id. at 12.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 18 (describing the CIA surveillance of the U.S. Mail from 1953 to 1973, and
CONINTELPRO, the FBI's domestic surveillance program that, "undermin[ed] the jobs of
political activists, sen[t] anonymous letters to 'spouses of intelligence targets for the purposes of destroying their marriages,'" and specifically targeted to derail the "civil rights
efforts" of Martin Luther King, Jr.).
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 26-27.
14. See Deborah Zabarenko, "LibraryLeader Questions Patriot Act, " Reuters, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2005/07/24/libraryleader_
questions-patriotact/ (last visited accessed 10 Oct. 10ober, 2005).
15. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 27.
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vate data aggregators and law enforcement has some frightening
16
implications.
This specific example is not as dire as it may initially seem. While
Section 21517 does expand law enforcement's power to obtain business
records by expanding the power to obtain records to "any tangible
things," it also provides some protection for the civil liberties of U.S. citizens. 18 One of the most obvious protections, one that seems to defuse the
concerns of librarians nationwide, 19 is that the powers granted to law
enforcement pursuant to Section 215 cannot be used for investigations of
U.S. citizens "conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution." 20 In this light, fears of law
enforcement becoming the thought police are somewhat mollified. This
sentence is awkward- not sure what you are trying to say - should it read
"thought police" in quotes ? (ex- "the fear that law enforcement officials
will become the "thought police" are somewhat mollified." Without further indication that a U.S. citizen is involved in terrorist activity, law
enforcement cannot utilize its expanded powers to target someone based
solely on choice of reading material. The potential for abuse remains,
but it is worth noting that the power itself is no greater than that of
criminal investigators who, via Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, are empowered to simply subpoena "any books, papers,
documents, data or other objects." 2 1 Moreover, given this section of the
Federal Rules, criminal investigators have always been able to obtain
business records, including library records via subpoena. It seems that
this power to obtain library records has not been recently utilized by
22
criminal investigators.
To address O'Harrow's main concern, the ability to access other business records, it is worth noting that most of this information has been
freely given by consumers to third parties over the years. The Supreme
Court has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in
records of this nature. 2 3 This seems rather logical, especially given the
16. Id. (commenting that due to the vast amount of data already aggregated into consumer profiles, increasing law enforcement's power to obtain those records gives it an unprecedented look into our private lives).
17. 50 U.S.C. §1861-1863 et. seq. (2001)..
18. 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(1) (2001)..
19. See D. Zabarenko supra n. 13 (indicating that the president of the American Library Association fears that this "Kafkaesque" change to the existing law will "[erode] the
presumed trust" between patron and librarian).
20. 50 U.S.C. §1861(a)(1)..
21. See Andrew C. McCarthy, "Why Sections 214 and 215 Should Be Retained, in
p.49, PatriotDebates: Experts Debate The PatriotAct, 49 (Stewart Baker & John Kavanagh, eds., . (American Bar Association Standing Comm. on Law and Natl. Sec. 2005).
22. Id. at 50.
23. See Id. at 49 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)).
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scope of the dissemination of those records. As O'Harrow notes throughout No Place To Hide, private data aggregators have amassed and trade
massive amounts of consumer data. The databases of Acxiom alone hold
as much information as a "50,000 mile-high stack of King James Bibles." 24 At some point, consumers gave this information to a third party
and lost their expectation of privacy in that information. While the reality of Section 215 may seem to defuse O'Harrow's fears, the question that
begs asking is whether it is good public policy to allow our personal information to continue to be traded and collected like baseball cards. To this
extent, No Place To Hide is extremely valuable as a tool to inform Americans so that future policy choices can be made with a more informed populace behind them. His ominous tone aside, O'Harrow does a good job of
setting the stage for the rest of the book. By raising awareness of law
enforcement's access to personal information and invoking the memory
of its misconduct in the past, he highlights the impact of possible abuse
of increased domestic spying power in the Information Age.
This treasure trove of personal information is perhaps the most disturbing and prominent theme in No Place To Hide. Most interesting is
O'Harrow's account of the development of the data aggregation industry,
and the extent to which it has already developed dossiers on Americans.
As early as 1964, it was possible to buy lists of consumers organized by
such categories as "a thousand women who had bought a 'bust developer'
product." 25 For a bit more than fifteen dollars, it was possible to obtain a
list of "the names and addresses of newlyweds, 500,000 in all."26 Leading the industry, and using the existing computer technology to help process more data at a faster pace, the credit bureaus began building
comprehensive databases on consumers. 2 7 Some of the bureaus' methods for collecting information may be surprising to some Americans. For
instance, a large amount of unverified information was collected by private investigators going door-to-door and asking questions about consumers. 2 8 As technology developed, the consumer dossiers helped create
specialized services that are now commonplace in our society, 29 including "instant credit, cheaper mortgages, a panoply of shopping options,
30
and... detailed and accurate phone books."
As O'Harrow aptly notes, the growing consumer profiles were generally available for a fee if one was determined to obtain them. 3 1 This ac24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 37.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
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tivity naturally raised the suspicions of civil libertarians who warned
against a future where personal information became "an economically
desirable commodity and a source of power." 32 As the power of
microprocessors increased, several giants in data aggregation began to
grow. By obtaining customer information from other companies, Acxiom
and other aggregators build their databases while helping those companies learn "more about what makes their customers tick."3 3 Acxiom and
its peers deny that they are secretly collecting information and tout their
ability to make their use of their data "entirely transparent to the
34
consumer."
Although data aggregators are cast as businesses bent on collecting
consumer information without considering privacy issues, it is worth
noting that a large amount of this data is willingly provided by the consumer. One example is the success that Cond6 Nast has had with its
Preferred Subscriber Network. In 1998, subscribers to Cond6 Nast publications had the opportunity to fill out an eight-page survey. The survey, covering topics ranging from level of education to whether a
subscriber suffered the heartbreak of halitosis, was widely successful in
helping the publisher learn more about its subscribers. 35 O'Harrow
maintains his cautionary tone by stating, "What few of [the subscribers]
realize is how their responses become part of a vast and growing information market." 36 While the information collected by the Preferred Subscriber Network surveys is highly personal in nature, it is worth
restating that subscribers freely provided this information and that once
given, they cannot reasonably expect it to remain private. Ignoring his
often ominous tone, readers of No Place To Hide would do well to realize
what this means for the consumer: don't give anyone information you
don't want shared. 37 Since the data aggregation industry has embraced
computers and database technology, that statement bears even more
weight - one of Acxiom's data products indexes "almost 200 million peo38
ple living in 110 million households."
One of the most frightening things about private databases is that
they are at risk of being misused by would-be identity thieves. Searching
Google News for "identity theft" or "stolen customer records" turns up
thousands of articles on the subject. While it may seem that identity
theft has been increasing lately, the increase in reports relates to a re32. See iUd. (referencing Arthur R. Miller's text, The Assault on Privacy).
33. Id. at 43.
34. Id. at 52.
35. Id. at 53-55.
36. Id. at 54.
37. It is worth noting, however, that the Federal Trade Commission does, to some extent, enforce the privacy policies of web sites that collect personal information.
38. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 61.
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cently enacted California statute that requires businesses to notify customers when their data is stolen. 3 9 When it was announced that one of
MasterCard's third-party processors suffered a security breach that put
forty million customers at risk of fraud, 40 affected consumers knew to
request a new account number. Companies like Acxiom are also at risk;
when their security is breached, the complex dossiers they maintain are
exposed to potential misuse. Acxiom suffered a breach in 2003 that resulted in the records of about twenty million consumers, a total cost of
$3.2 million for the data aggregator. 4 1 As No Place To Hide indicates,
sometimes the costs passed on to the consumer have a greater price.
Michael Berry's tale, a large portion of the book's third chapter,
demonstrates the impact of losing one's personal information to someone
with less than honest intentions. While attempting to consolidate some
debt onto one credit card, he discovered that his identity had been used
to open several credit accounts at various retailers, sometimes with
clearly incorrect information. 42 As if ruined credit wasn't bad enough, a
convicted murderer had assumed Berry's identity and killed again, leaving Berry as a suspect, at least in name. 43 Although the criminal was
eventually caught, and Berry's credit reports were slowly repaired, he
spent almost three years of his life trying to clear his credit and worrying
that he would be arrested due to mistaken identity. 4 4 What is perhaps
most disturbing is that Michael Berry is not alone. Given the size of
some private databases, and the myriad of sources from which their data
is compiled, it should be no surprise that identity theft is on the rise and
the criminals often difficult to trace. The Commercial Crimes Division of
the Los Angeles Police Department received one hundred calls a day regarding identity theft cases in 2003, but was only able to investigate a
handful of those calls.4 5 According to private research group Gartner,
Inc., seven million Americans fell prey to identity thieves in 2002.46
According to O'Harrow, the weak link both in security and in repairing credit reports is the credit bureaus and data aggregators. By opening
accounts when inaccurate information is provided, 4 7 using easy-to-find
39. See Jeanne Sahadi, "ID data breaches: as rampant as it seems," CNN Money.com,
available at: http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/21/pf/breach-followup/index.htm?cnn=yes (last
visitedaccessed Oct.ober 12, 2005).
40. See Jeanne Sahadi, "40m credit cards hacked," CNN Money.com, available at:
http://money.cnn.com2OO5/O6/17/news/master-card/index.htm?cnn=yes
(last visitedaccessed Oct.ober 12, 2005).
41. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 71-72.
42. Id. at 75-77.
43. Id. at 80-81.
44. Id. at 74-97.
45. Id. at 82-83.
46. Id. at 78.
47. Id. at 77.
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tidbits of information as customer identifiers for phone transactions, 48
having inadequate data security,49 and sometimes failing to fully correct
mistakes on someone's credit report, 50 it certainly seems that the industry is guilty as charged. Although No Place To Hide shies away from
making policy suggestions, it seems that the lackadaisical security policies of the keepers of consumer data are quickly becoming fertile ground
for a new breed of lawsuit. One example is the lawsuit that Eileen
Goldberg filed against ChoicePoint in February 2005. 5 1 The complaint
alleges that since ChoicePoint compiles and sells consumer data for a
profit, it owes a higher duty of care towards those whose data it compiles. 5 2 Identity thieves, posing as legitimate businesses, set up at least
fifty accounts with ChoicePoint, giving them access to "Social Security
numbers, credit histories and other personal information," all collected
from consumers and aggregated by ChoicePoint. 53 This behavior contin54
ued for a year before ChoicePoint even realized what had happened.
While ChoicePoint's negligent behavior is frightening, what is even
more frightening is that it sells a virtual identity-check-in-a-box product
called "Employee Background Check" at Sam's Club locations nationwide. 5 5 Although the product comes with release forms that must be
signed by the subject of the identity check that are ostensibly audited by
ChoicePoint, the company has never specified how or when these audits
would occur. 56 If data aggregators are going to continue to sell consumer
information, they must be held to a higher standard of care. Other lawsuits filed against data collectors have failed. 57 Courts have been hesitant to establish a duty of care owed by data aggregators to the
individuals whose data they collect because those consumers are not customers of the data aggregators. 58 Despite this, as these companies continue to lose information to thieves and scammers, it seems that our
legal system will be forced to address the issue, either via strong legisla48. Id. at 79-80.
49. See Sahadi, supra n. 40 (discussing a data security breach at Acxiom).
50. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 97.
51. See Kim Zetter, "CaliforniaWoman Sues ChoicePoint,"Wired News (Feb. 24, 2005)
available at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66710,0O.html?tw=WN-story-related (Feb. 24, 2005).(last visited October 12, 2005).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 135.
56. Id.
57. See Zetter supra n. 51 (indicating that previous negligence-based identity lawsuits
have failed).
58. See Kim Zetter, "ID Theft Victims Could Lose Twice," Wired News (Feb. 23, 2005)
available at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,66685,00.html (Feb. 23, 2005)(last
visited October 12, 2005).
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tion and stronger enforcement or via case precedents that indicate a duty
of care to the subjects of their extensive databases.
It is ironic that data aggregators like ChoicePoint and Acxiom have
farmed their services out to law enforcement, especially since ChoicePoint was unable to verify the identity of its "customers," allowing identity thieves to buy consumer information.5 9 Although it does not draw
this correlation, No Place To Hide spends significant time discussing the
relationship between data aggregators and law enforcement. In the
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York City and
Washington, D.C., data aggregators realized that they could use their
vast collections of consumer information to assist law enforcement in
catching criminals and preventing further terrorist attacks. 60 This assistance was also worth a hefty sum in government contracts awarded to
61
the aggregators.
The power of consumer databases and profiling technology is both
shocking and amazing. One example is Seisint's product, The Matrix.
During the D.C. Sniper shootings of 2002, law enforcement was scrambling to capture the shooters with little luck. Hank Asher and other
Seisint executives were frustrated that D.C.-area law enforcement had
been unwilling to send data to Matrix. 6 2 However, after lobbying the
FBI to produce information and after another victim was killed, law enforcement provided a wealth of information to Matrix. 63 When combined
with the power of the Matrix profiling system, Seisint predicted that it
would take a week at most to find the shooters. 64 On October 23, law
enforcement claimed that it had a suspect. 65 After running the suspect
through Matrix, the technicians at Seisint felt that it wasn't the right
person. 66 Starting with a database of over 21,000 John Williamses, Matrix narrowed down the field based on law enforcement input until a man
from Tacoma, Washington had been singled out.6 7 As it turned out, this
was the John Williams who, along with John Lee Malvo, had been responsible for the killings in the D.C. area; by October 24, 2002, the pair
68
had been captured.
Despite this criminal-catching potential, outcry from lobbyists and
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 56-57, 98-100, 152.
Id.
Id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 119.
Id.
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privacy groups ultimately killed Matrix's adoption by law enforcement. 69
The main concern of the privacy lobby was that allowing law enforcement access to consumer databases would ultimately be an end-run
70
around the evidence-gathering restrictions of the Fourth Amendment.
John Poindexter, of the failed Total Information Awareness project, also
had misgivings about Matrix, largely based on the background of Hank
Asher, founder of Seisint. 7 1 O'Harrow spends a considerable amount of
time discussing Asher's past, describing him as a drug-smuggler and indicating that he may have had ties to the plan to assassinate Daniel
Ortega, the former Nicaraguan President. 72 While these characterizations may be newsworthy, and do cause one to question whether a "rogue
fellow" 73 should have access to so much consumer information, let alone
access to Federal law enforcement, it detracts from the concerns of the
privacy lobby. What is most frightening about the collusion between the
data aggregators and law enforcement is that the ability to profile is increased exponentially. While the information is already technically public, having been freely given to private companies by consumers, allowing
law enforcement to use the databases to profile suspects seems like bad
policy, even if it is Constitutionally acceptable. The ACLU took issue
with this approach, describing it as "replacing an unpopular Big Brother
initiative with a lot of Little Brothers."7 4 As opposed to spending several
pages focusing on Hank Asher's possibly shady background, No Place To
Hide should have focused on the arguments both for and against systems
like Matrix.
This is not to say that O'Harrow completely ignores the potential
problems of the trend of data aggregator and law enforcement cooperation. One example is the fact that no matter how amazingly sophisticated, consumer databases are only as accurate as the information they
are provided and sometimes they just produce false positive results.
O'Harrow points to DBT's list-cleansing efforts that excluded many Florida voters from the polls in November 2000. 75 Due to flawed information
and very little double-checking by election officials, a large number of
Florida voters were inappropriately barred from voting due to false-positives for felony convictions. 76 Whether this gave George W. Bush the
69. Id. at 122-23.
70. Id. at 123.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 111, 112.
73. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Lecture, No Place To Hide, (Chicago, Ill., Apr. 7, 2005) (copy
of transcript on file with The John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information
Law).'NEED CITE FROM LECTURE TRANSCRIPT
74. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 123.
75. Id. at 125-29.
76. Id.
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advantage in the 2000 elections aside, O'Harrow echoes a point made by
Chris Hoofnagle, an attorney for the Electronic Privacy Information
Center: "By outsourcing the collection of records, the government doesn't
have to ensure the data is accurate, or have any provisions to correct it in
the same way it would under the Privacy Act."7 7 Hoofnagle characterizes this behavior as "sidestepping the laws intended to protect individu78
als from government intrusion."
This point is reinforced by O'Harrow's descriptions of developing
technologies like face-recognition software and other biometric identification systems. Although he does recognize that face recognition and
other biometric technologies may help victims of identity theft like
Michael Berry,7 9 he quickly turns back to his cautionary tone stating,
"The use of biometric identifiers shifts an enormous amount of power
into the hands of those who control the equipment. . . what about when
government turns to those records to satisfy it obsession for security?"8 0
O'Harrow likens this to the "Panopticon," a theoretical prison, the design
of which makes prisoners feel constantly watched. 8 ' While this could be
the end-result of a society in which the government makes heavy use of
surveillance cameras, Americans who live in urban areas are already being watched more than they know. For instance, the NYC Surveillance
Camera project has lists and maps of the location of all security cameras
in Manhattan.8 2 The City of Chicago has similarly dense cameras in the
downtown Loop area, 8 3 and the City of Chicago Police Department has
deployed surveillance cameras controllable by police via squad car
laptop.8 4 Adding face-recognition technology to these existing systems,
and linking private and governmental camera systems to a common
database would certainly put individuals in public places under closer
scrutiny; however, one has never had an expectation of privacy in public
places. If these technologies cannot reach into the homes of Americans,
it seems unlikely that our society will become as extreme as Bentham's
Panopticon. Certainly, building databases of biometric information
would require the same work-around as systems like the Matrix, such
that private aggregators would need to index the data and then sell it to
77. Id. at 137.
78. Id. at 138.
79. Id. at 167.
80. Id. at 169-70.
81. Id. at 170.
82. See NYC Surveillance Camera Project Maps, available at: http://www.mediaeater.
com/cameras/locations.html (last visitedaccessed Nov.ember 1, 2005).
83. See Surveillance Cameras in Chicago, "Chicago, IL," available at: http://www.not
bored.org/chicago-SCP.html (last visitedaccessed Nov.ember 1, 2005).
84. See Andrew Buchanan, "On Chicago Streets, Cameras Are Watching," The Christian Science Monitor (July 30, 2003) available at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0730/p01
s02-usgn.html (July 30, 2003).(last visited November 1, 2005).
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the government. Even then, if done at the request of law enforcement, it
would raise questions as to whether the activity was protected by the
Privacy Act of 1974. As the technology stands right now, it is highly unlikely that face recognition and biometrics will be the invasive nightmare
85
that O'Harrow warns against any time soon.
On the whole, No Place To Hide is valuable because it serves to inform Americans about the extent to which their personal information is
being used both by private companies and law enforcement. The amount
of personal information available to data aggregators and government is
staggering. The current capabilities of consumer databases are fascinatingly frightening and they are only increasing. Nascent technologies like
biometrics could enable a much more pervasive surveillance culture.
These statements are true, but they are not set in stone. State legislatures are the most likely place for privacy to regain a foothold in the
American legal system. California has already passed legislation to help
its citizens shore up their informational privacy. The California Civil
Code requires that collectors of consumer data inform those potentially
affected by a breach of security.8 6 The result is that consumers nationwide are made aware of these security breaches, creating a trickle-up
effect that can help individuals protect their privacy.
This effect, in turn, increases individual awareness of privacy issues.
As more Americans become aware of the threats to their privacy, States
will be forced to address the concerns of their citizens. Additionally,
stalled Federal legislation like the Notification of Risk to Personal Data
Act may receive a second look from Congress.8 7 Citizens must be informed enough about the risks to their privacy to be concerned and demand protection. No Place To Hide meets this need, and its ominous
tone certainly drives the message home. Although all is not yet lost,
O'Harrow establishes the threats to privacy and provides Americans
with many valid reasons to be concerned.
85. See O'Harrow, supra n. 2, at 181.
86. CA Civ. Code §1798.29 (2001).
87. See Zetter, supra n. 58.

